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One of the central controversies in normative business ethics is the question
whether transactions and economic relationships can be wrongfully exploitative
despite being mutually beneficial and consensual. This article argues that any-
one who accepts a shareholder theory of business ethics should accept deonto-
logical constraints on mutually beneficial, consensual exploitation.
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INTRODUCTION
Many issues in business ethics concern the ethics of pricing. Is it ethical for a
profitable fashion company to pay garment workers in Bangladesh $2.50 for a
twelve-hour day? Is it ethical for a hotel to raise the price of hotel rooms after
a hurricane drives many people from their homes? Is it ethical for a pharmaceuti-
cal company in a country with no universal health insurance to charge whatever
price the market will bear for life-saving drugs? Normative business ethicists
divide on these questions. Some think that firms and their agents are always or
almost always morally permitted to charge whatever legally permitted prices will
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maximize their financial returns. Others think that firms and their agents are of-
ten morally required to deviate from a profit-maximizing strategy (or a net pres-
ent value maximizing strategy) to avoid exploiting customers or workers. On this
view, a transaction can be wrongfully exploitative despite being consensual and
beneficial to both parties.2
One might think that the camps in the debate about the ethics of pricing would
be the same as the two main camps in the debate about the proper ends of corpo-
rations or managers.3 The shareholder primacy view holds that corporations' and
managers' primary aim should be to promote shareholders' interests.4 Some ver-
sions of shareholder theory maintain that corporations and their managers should
be concerned specifically with shareholders' financial interests. Others acknowl-
edge that shareholders in a for-profit corporation could have non-financial inter-
ests with which the corporation could properly be concerned.5 According to
shareholder theorists of either type, a corporation and its managers should pursue
the interests of people who are not shareholders only insofar as doing so advances
the interests of shareholders. Normative stakeholder theories of business ethics,
by contrast, hold that corporations and managers should aim to benefit various
stakeholder groups, including customers and employees as well as shareholders.6
The interests of shareholders do not have priority over other stakeholders' inter-
ests. Stakeholder theories are compatible with norms against exploitation of
workers and customers. It may seem that shareholder theorists must reject such
norms. If firms' and managers' primary duty is to promote the interests of share-
holders, deviation from market prices would be justified only if there were a fi-
nancial benefit to doing so (e.g., paying an above-market wage to increase
employees' loyalty) or if this pricing policy would advance shareholders' inter-
ests in some other way.
1. See, e.g., Matt Zwolinski, Sweatshops, Choice, and Exploitation, 17 Bus. ETHICS Q. 689 (2007);
Benjamin Powell & Matt Zwolinski, The Ethical and Economic Case Against Sweatshop Labor: A
Critical Assessment, 107 J. Bus. ETHICS 449 (2012). Powell and Zwolinski allow that there are contexts
in which an individual may be morally required to offer a price that does not maximize her financial
returns. For instance, if one person fortuitously happens on another person in need of rescue, and the
rescuer would be costless for the rescuer, it is wrongfully exploitative to charge an extremely high price
for rescue. They think the intuitive judgment that rescue at a high price is exploitative only applies to
fortuitous rescues, not to professional operations. Id. at 466-67.
2. See, e.g., Robert Goodin, Exploiting a Situation and Exploiting a Person, in MODERN THEORIES
OF EXPLOITATION 166-200 (Andrew Reeve, ed., 1987); Michael Kates, Sweatshops, Exploitation, and
the Case for a Fair Wage, 27 J. POL. PHIL. 26 (2019); RUTH SAMPLE, EXPLOITATION: WHAT IT IS AND
WHY IT'S WRONG (2003); ALAN WERTHEIMER, EXPLOITATION (1996).
3. There are firms that are not corporations, but shareholder theory is concerned with the ethical
duties of corporations and corporate managers.
4. The classic statement of this view is in Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is
to Increase its Profits, N. Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970.
5. See, e.g., Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not
Market Value, 2 J. L. FIN. & AcCT. 247 (2017); Lynn A. Stout, The Problem of Corporate Purpose, 48
ISSUES IN Gov'T STUDY 1 (2012). These other interests may include pro-social interests, e.g., an interest
in preventing pollution.
6. See, e.g., R. EDWARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER APPROACH (1984).
EXPLOITATION AND DEONTOLOGICAL CONSTRAINTS
This article argues that a shareholder theory of business ethics is untenable
unless it includes prohibitions on mutually beneficial, consensual exploitation.
Rejecting all or most prohibitions on mutually beneficial, consensual exploitation
involves accepting some form of the so-called "non-worseness principle," which
holds that if a transaction or relationship is mutually beneficial, consensual, and
harmless to third parties, the transaction or relationship is not morally worse than
a decision not to interact.7 The non-worseness principle has counterintuitive
implications for interpersonal ethics. It implies that it is not wrong for one partner
in a romantic relationship to treat the other neglectfully, provided that the
neglected partner knew going into the relationship that it would be neglectful and
regards the relationship as a benefit. The non-worseness principle also has coun-
terintuitive implications for professional ethics. It implies that it cannot be wrong
for a dentist to give a patient a shoddily-applied crown, provided that the patient
consented to substandard care and that the patient is better off with this crown
than with no crown at all. Given the counterintuitive implications of the non-
worseness principle, it cannot be taken as axiomatic; it stands in need of defense.
But the plausible theoretical defenses of the non-worseness principle are incom-
patible with any plausible defense of a shareholder theory of business ethics.
Only an ethical theory that includes deontological constraints can serve as a
principled ground for a shareholder theory of business ethics. Any ethical theory
that rejects the possibility of wrongful, mutually beneficial, consensual exploita-
tion must also reject the deontological constraints which shareholder theory
presupposes. Thus, shareholder theorists of business ethics should endorse anti-
exploitation norms which sometimes require corporations to deviate voluntarily
from market prices.
This article proceeds as follows. Section I explains why skepticism about
wrongful, mutually beneficial, consensual exploitation is often explained in terms
of the so-called "non-worseness principle." This principle has counter-intuitive
implications and thus stands in need of defense. Section II argues that the most
promising way of defending the non-worseness principle is an appeal to an ethical
theory that rejects deontological constraints. Such an ethical theory is incompati-
ble with a shareholder theory of business ethics. Section III argues that one of the
most prominent deontological theories of ethics, namely Kantian ethics, is incom-
patible with the non-worseness principle.8 Kantian ethics supports the view that
7. The non-worseness principle is compatible with anti-exploitation norms that concern cases in
which the parties to a transaction have a moral obligation to transact, independent of any agreements
they have made with each other. For example, if there is a duty of easy rescue, the non-worseness
principle is compatible with a prohibition on charging high prices for morally obligatory rescues. But
the non-worseness principle can be used to support the rejection of anti-exploitation norms in almost all
business contexts. Conversely, it is unclear how one could reject all anti-exploitation norms in contexts
in which transaction is not obligatory unless one accepts the non-worseness principle.
8. In labeling Kant's ethics "deontological," I adopt a certain view of deontology. A deontological
constraint is an ethical constraint on the pursuit of an end or goal that would normally be good to pursue.
See infra Section III. A deontological moral theory can include a theory of the good, as Kant's does.
When Barbara Herman argues that "Kantian ethics is not a deontology," she is using the term
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mutually beneficial, consensual transactions and relationships can be wrongful.
Section IV explains why other ethical theories that include deontological con-
straints are unlikely to be able to support both the non-worseness principle and a
shareholder theory of business ethics.
I. THE NON-WORSENESS PRINCIPLE
Whether there is such a thing as mutually beneficial, consensual, wrongful ex-
ploitation is a matter of debate. The type of exploitation this article addresses is
exploitation in transactions and economic relationships between individuals or
organizations. A relationship or transaction is wrongfully exploitative if one party
benefits unfairly in relation to the other.9 This conception of wrongful exploita-
tion leaves open the question whether there is such a thing as exploitation that is
not wrongful. Since this is a relational conception of wrongful exploitation, it
allows for the possibility that there could be wrongful exploitation in a society
that has just institutions and a just distribution of resources. Conversely, there
could be fair, non-exploitative transactions in an unjust society. The question at
issue is whether one party to a transaction or relationship can benefit unfairly in
relation to the other if both parties consent to the terms and both parties benefit.
The debate about the possibility of wrongful, mutually beneficial, consen-
sual exploitation has often been framed as a debate about the non-worseness
principle. The non-worseness principle is used to defend the view that mutually
beneficial, consensual transactions and relationships do not wrong the parties.
Alan Wertheimer, who introduced but does not endorse the non-worseness
principle, has presented it as follows:
It cannot be morally worse for A to interact with B than not to interact with B
if: (1) the interaction is better for B than non-interaction, (2) B consents to the
interaction, (3) such interaction has no negative effects on others. 0
Given two modest assumptions, the non-worseness principle implies that there
is no such thing as wrongful, mutually beneficial, consensual exploitation in typi-
cal business contexts. The first modest assumption is that in typical business con-
texts, it is permissible for one market participant to decline to transact with
another. 1 Typically, e.g., an employer is not morally required to give a job to any
particular person; a buyer is not morally required to form a contract with any
"deontology" in a different and narrower sense. See BARBARA HERMAN, THE PRACTICE OF MORAL
JUDGMENT 210 (1993).
9. I take this characterization of exploitation from WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 16.
10. Zwolinski quotes this formulation from an unpublished conference paper of Wertheimer's.
Zwolinski, supra note 1, at 708. For Wertheimer's discussion of the non-worseness principle, see
WERTHEIMER, supra note 2, at 289-93.
11. It can be wrong to decline to transact with someone for a particular motive, e.g., race
discrimination, though it would not be wrong to decline to transact with the same person on other
grounds.
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particular supplier. The second modest assumption is that wrongful acts are
morally worse than permissible acts. 12
Suppose A offers B an employment contract, B correctly judges that taking
this contract is better than not taking the contract, and B consents. Suppose fur-
ther that the contract has no negative effects on third parties. Then, since A would
have been morally permitted to decline to offer B any employment contract, the
non-worseness principle implies that A's offer is not morally worse than a per-
missible choice-non-transaction. So, the non-worseness principle implies that
A's offer is morally permissible. It is permissible, according to the non-worseness
principle, even if the terms of the employment contract appear very unfair to
B. Offering a job with low wages, long hours, and dangerous working conditions
is not wrong as long three conditions are met: the job makes employees better off
than they would have been, absent an offer; the employees give informed con-
sent; and third parties are not harmed.13 The non-worseness principle has similar
implications for market transactions of other types.14
Many ethicists who study exploitation find the non-worseness principle attrac-
tive. Some defend it." Others reject it but find it intuitively compelling; they
think that rejecting the non-worseness principle requires explanation.1 6 The wide-
spread appeal of the non-worseness principle is surprising, since its implications
outside of ordinary business contexts are bizarre.
Consider the implications of the principle for romantic relationships. Suppose
that A and B are in a romantic relationship, and that A often neglects B and B's
needs. A is capable of treating B better but chooses to treat B with neglect. B was
not coerced into this relationship, and B entered the relationship with open eyes;
it was clear that A intended to treat B in this way. Because of B's strong feelings
for A, B prefers being in a neglectful relationship with A to being single or to
being in a relationship with someone else. The relationship between A and B
does not harm third parties. Perhaps because they keep the relationship secret,
perhaps because they are socially isolated, or perhaps because A's poor treatment
of B takes place only in private, others do not notice A's poor treatment of B. The
relationship does not interfere with any obligations A or B have to third parties.
12. For discussion of this assumption's merits, see Benjamin Ferguson, The Paradox of Exploitation,
81 ERKENNTNIS 951 (2016).
13. If there is harm to third parties, but the contract is mutually beneficial and consensual, a
supporter of the non-worseness principle would presumably conclude that the transaction is possibly
wrongful but not wrongfully exploitative, since the wrong involved is not a wrong to the employee.
Some additional assumptions would need to be added to get this conclusion from the formulation of the
non-worseness principle above.
14. It will not rule out the possibility of wrongful exploitation when a market participant has a moral
obligation to transact. For example, perhaps the owner of the only well in a desert has an obligation to
sell drinking water to all thirsty travelers. Since it would be impermissible to turn away customers, the
non-worseness principle is compatible with the view that it is wrong for the well's owner to charge an
unfairly high price.
15. Zwolinski is one of its supporters. See Zwolinski, supra note 1, at 708-10.
16. See Ferguson, supra note 12; WERTHEIMER, supra note 2.
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According to the non-worseness principle, A's neglectful relationship with B is
not morally worse than a decision not to enter a relationship with B at all. Since it
would have been permissible for A not to enter a relationship with B at all, the
non-worseness principle implies that A's neglectful treatment of B is permissible,
and that B has no legitimate complaint about A's conduct. This implication is
absurd. B plainly has a legitimate complaint about A's neglect. That A had no
obligation to enter a romantic relationship with B does not justify A's mistreat-
ment of B. It is permissible to choose to be single or to decline any person's
romantic advances. But if one chooses to be in a romantic relationship, one has a
moral obligation to treat one's partner with concern, not with neglect. 17
The non-worseness principle also has counterintuitive implications for profes-
sional integrity. It implies that professionals who have no obligation to provide a
service cannot have an obligation always to provide service that meets minimum
quality standards. Suppose, for instance, that a dentist does not have an obligation
to give a certain patient a crown. The dentist offers to provide a shoddy crown
and frankly admits to the patient that the crown on offer will be shoddy work,
likely to need replacement sooner than a properly applied crown would. The
patient regards a shoddy crown as a benefit and consents to this procedure.
According to the non-worseness principle, either the dentist does nothing wrong
by applying the shoddy crown, or the dentist's application of the shoddy crown is
wrong only because it harms third parties. 8 But the dentist does not wrong the
patient. This is a counterintuitive result. Intuitively, dentists should not know-
ingly do shoddy work. They should only provide crowns that are up to professio-
nal standards. A dentist could choose not to take on a given patient, and thus have
no obligation to give this patient any crowns, properly or improperly applied. But
if the dentist takes on this patient and decides to give the patient a crown, the den-
tist has an obligation to give the patient a properly-applied crown.
Given the surprising implications of the non-worseness principle, this principle
stands in need of justification. When an alleged moral principle conflicts with in-
tuitive judgments about specific cases, one cannot justifiably continue to accept
the principle simply because one finds it intuitively attractive. One must have fur-
ther reasons to accept the principle in the face of this conflict. There are broadly
two ways in which the non-worseness principle could be motivated theoretically.
One possible approach would be to make a more general argument against the ex-
istence of deontological constraints. Section II will discuss this approach. The
17. Wertheimer discusses a proposal of marriage in which it is understood in advance that the
distribution of financial resources and household duties will be exploitative. He argues that exploitative
marriage is a possible counterexample to the non-worseness principle. WERTHEMER, supra note 2, at
290. Powell and Zwolinski suggest that intuitions about the case are unreliable because it is too
abstractly described. Powell & Zwolinski, supra note 1, at 470. The example of neglect is not
susceptible to this reply. There may be disagreement about what constitutes neglect of one's partner's
needs, but neglecting one's partner is indisputably wrong.
18. Perhaps it wrongs the dentist who would have received this patient's business had the first dentist
chosen to turn away this patient altogether. Or perhaps it wrongs the patient's insurance company, its
shareholders, and its other customers (who may face higher premiums as a result of waste).
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other approach, discussed in Sections III and IV, would be to accept the existence
of deontological constraints but to give some reason that these constraints only
apply to actions that cause net harm to someone or actions that involve a non-con-
sensual violation of a right.
II. SHAREHOLDER THEORY PRESUPPOSES DEONTOLOGICAL CONSTRAINTS
Deontological constraints are ethical limitations on the permissible pursuit of
ends or goals that would normally be good to pursue. For example, if there is a
deontological constraint against lying, one should not lie to achieve one's ends,
even if those ends are good ends. Deontological constraints may be absolute (e.g.,
"Never lie") or pro tanto (e.g., "Only lie if it would achieve a very great good or
prevent a grave evil"). Whether a deontological constraint takes an absolute or a
non-absolute form, it does not function in the same way as an ethically obligatory
end. If avoiding lies were an ethically obligatory end but not a deontological con-
straint, one would be justified in lying to prevent five other people from telling
lies. A deontological constraint on lying, by contrast, prohibits telling lies for the
sake of preventing others from lying.1 9 Not all moral requirements are deontolog-
ical constraints; moral requirements to adopt certain goals or ends are not deonto-
logical constraints. For instance, if there is a general moral duty to care about
other people's interests, that duty is not a deontological constraint.
Some moral theories deny that there are deontological constraints. These theo-
ries hold that all moral requirements tell people what ends they should pursue,
instead of telling people which means are permissible. One reason to reject deon-
tological constraints is that they conflict with the widely-held view that rationality
is concerned with maximizing the goodness of outcomes. 20 If some action, e.g.,
lying, is bad, maximizing rationality would imply that it is good to reduce the
total number of occurrences of this action by committing an action of that type
(e.g., lying to prevent lies). If the maximizing conception of rationality is correct,
and if there are thus no deontological constraints, there is a straightforward way
to defend the non-worseness principle. Absent deontological constraints, it is
always permissible to perform an action that will produce better effects than
another permissible action would. Assume, controversially but not implausibly,
that the only effects that matter are effects on the welfare of humans and other
sentient creatures. Assume, as before, that in normal business contexts, it is per-
missible to choose not to transact with someone. It would follow that in normal
business contexts, it is permissible to transact with someone in a way that benefits
that person and harms no humans or other sentient creatures. A bit more would
need to be said to defend the non-worseness principle as expressed by
19. For discussion of deontological constraints and the contrast between deontological constraints
and "utilitarianism of rights," see ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY STATE AND UTOPIA 28-33 (1974). Nozick
calls deontological constraints "side constraints."
20. See Samuel Scheffler, Agent-Centered Restrictions, Rationality, and the Virtues, 94 MIND 409
(1985).
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Wertheimer; some permissible acts might be morally worse than others.21 But a
sound argument against deontological constraints could very likely be extended
to provide an argument for the non-worseness principle or something very much
like it.
The strategy of defending the non-worseness principle by rejecting deontologi-
cal constraints is not available to those who accept any form of shareholder theory
as a theory of business ethics. Recall that a shareholder theory of business ethics
holds that either managers or corporations (or both) have an ethical duty to pro-
mote the interests of shareholders, possibly to the exclusion of other people's
interests.2 2 Shareholder theories of business ethics contrast with some other theo-
ries that could be labeled "shareholder theories." For example, the view that gov-
ernment should regulate firms so as to motivate managers to promote the
interests of shareholders is not a shareholder theory of business ethics. It does not
address the ethical question what corporations or managers ought to do.
Shareholder theories of business ethics are compatible with deontological con-
straints. The only claim common to all shareholder theories of business ethics is a
claim about what goals or ends corporations and managers should pursue: they
should pursue (some subset of) the shareholders' ends. This claim leaves open
what deontological constraints, if any, should constrain corporations' or manag-
ers' pursuit of shareholders' goals or ends. The most famous shareholder theory,
Milton Friedman's, holds that there are, in fact, deontological constraints on a
manager's pursuit of financial returns for shareholders: the constraints of "law
and ethical custom."2 3 It is less obvious that shareholder theories of business
ethics must implicitly accept deontological constraints. They thus cannot defend
the non-worseness principle by rejecting deontological constraints.
To see this, consider first those forms of shareholder theory that assert a duty
for corporations to put shareholders' interests first. This duty may be distinct
from any duties managers have to shareholders. No doubt corporations can have
ethical duties, and these duties may be distinct from the duties of any human indi-
vidual. After all, there are things a large organization can do that no human indi-
vidual, including the organization's leader, can achieve through individual
action. That said, an ethical duty for corporations to promote shareholders' inter-
ests would be idle if it were not supported by an ethical duty for at least some
agents of a corporation to assist the corporation in promoting shareholders' inter-
ests. Presumably, these duty-bound agents must normally include high-level
21. If motives are relevant to the moral evaluation of actions, then a permissible act with an evil
motive could be morally worse than a permissible omission with an innocent motive or no motive.
22. One could hold the view that managers should promote shareholders' interests while denying
that the purpose of business, as a social practice, is to promote the interests of shareholders (or investors
more generally). For instance, one could argue, as Donaldson does, that the purpose of business as a
social practice is to serve customers and to provide employment, but that there are conceivable
economic contexts in which business collectively benefits customers and workers most if managers
focus on providing returns to shareholders. THOMAs DONALDSON, CORPORATIONS & MORALITY 56
(1982).
23. See Friedman, supra note 4.
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corporate managers. So in practice, there can be no duty for corporations to pro-
mote shareholders' interests, possibly to the exclusion of other people's interests,
unless high-level managers have a duty to help their corporations promote share-
holders' interests.
Consider, then, the claim that managers have an ethical duty to put sharehold-
ers' interest first when making decisions on behalf of the corporation. This duty
must itself be justified on the basis of some higher ethical principle. Some ethical
claims can reasonably be accepted without further explanation. For example,
one could reasonably accept, without further explanation, that suffering is bad,
and that people have pro tanto reason not to cause suffering. The claim that man-
agers' end should be to promote the interests of shareholders is not plausibly
foundational in this way. It may be logically possible for managers to have a free-
floating duty to maximize value for shareholders, a duty not grounded on any
broader ethical principle, but it is extremely unlikely. If managers have a duty to
maximize shareholder value, or more generally to promote shareholders' interests
potentially to the exclusion of other people's interests, this duty must have some
more foundational ground.
What could this more foundational ground be? Perhaps a duty to maximize
shareholder value is grounded in a reason to promote some other end. A strong
managerial duty to maximize shareholder value could not be grounded in manag-
ers' self-interest. Doubtless if corporate governance structures are well-designed,
it will often be in managers' interest to do what is in the shareholders' interest. It
is not difficult to imagine scenarios in which a manager's interests diverge from
the shareholders' interests, both in the short term and in the long term. Consider a
narrowly self-interested manager who is a skilled criminal and can defraud the
company without detection. Fraud may be in the manager's interest, both in the
short term and in the long term, but it is clearly not in the shareholders' interest.
The interests of managers and shareholders can also diverge in contexts involving
no crime, as the literature on agency theory shows.24 It may be in a manager's
interest to do things that will make the job much more pleasant but will not opti-
mize the firm's financial performance: making extensive, costly use of perqui-
sites, for instance, or simply not working with the greatest possible effort. 25 It
may sometimes be in a manager's interest (and other employees' interest) to keep
a firm or a division in operation, though it would be in the interest of diversified
shareholders for the firm or the division to be liquidated.2 6 Shareholder theory, as
a theory of managerial ethics, asserts that when managers' personal interests con-
flict with the interests of shareholders, their ethical responsibility is to put the
24. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3. J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
25. Id. at 313. It might also be in a manager's interest to avoid choices that are in shareholders'
financial interest but that will create interpersonal friction between the manager and subordinates.
26. See J. B. Heaton, The 'Long Term' in Corporate Law, 72 Bus. LAW. 353 (2017).
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interests of shareholders first.2 7 This duty could not be grounded on self-interest
alone.
A parallel problem prevents a duty to maximize aggregate welfare from
grounding a managerial duty to maximize the satisfaction of shareholders' inter-
ests (whether limited to shareholders' financial interests or not). Sometimes, per-
haps often, attempting to maximize the satisfaction of shareholders' interests is
the best way for managers to maximize the aggregate welfare of all human
beings.28 Focusing on shareholders' interests is likely to increase investors' trust,
both in one's own company and in equity investment in general. It is thus likely
to increase investments in productive enterprises that benefit customers and
employees. Nevertheless, there are cases in which managers clearly can increase
aggregate welfare by doing something that advances shareholders' interests less
than alternative actions. Consider Peter Unger's example of the wealth manager
who can secretly embezzle some money from a billionaire and use that money to
save lives with a donation to an efficient charitable organization. If the wealth
manager is right to think that he can embezzle undetected, this theft will be
welfare-maximizing.2 9 The embezzlement certainly reduces the value of the bil-
lionaire's investment, and it is extremely unlikely to promote the satisfaction of
the billionaire's interests overall. If the billionaire wanted to use this money for
charitable purposes, the billionaire presumably would have done so.
As a real-life example, consider Merck's investment in developing ivermectin
as a drug to treat river blindness and its later decision to donate the drug.30 It was
clear at the time of the decision to invest in developing ivermectin that if the drug
trials succeeded (as they did, and were likely to), and if the drug was then distrib-
uted, it would save hundreds of thousands of people from blindness. It would also
enable farmers to return safely to fertile land near rivers. Thus, unless Merck
could have used its money in a way that would do even more good for human
health, the decision to invest in the drug could be expected to maximize aggregate
welfare. Likewise, the later decision to donate the drug (after failing to find an
NGO sponsor) could be expected to maximize aggregate welfare. It was far from
clear, at the times Merck made these two decisions, that developing or donating
ivermectin would be financially good for the company. The firm could not expect
to profit from sales; river blindness patients could not afford $1 per pill, let alone
the $3 normally charged for a dose of an anti-parasitic drug. The firm might have
benefited financially either from positive publicity or from increased morale
among its research scientists, but both potential benefits are speculative and diffi-
cult to quantify. What shareholder theories demand in this situation is empirically
unclear, but what act-utilitarianism demands is perfectly clear: invest in the
27. See JOSEPH HEATH, MORALITY, COMPETITION, AND THE FIRM 31-36 (2014).
28. Or the average welfare of all human beings, or the aggregate welfare of all sentient beings.
29. PETER UNGER, LIVING HIGH AND LETTING DIE 64 (1996).
30. See Kimberly Layne Collins, Profitable Gifts: A History of the Merck Mectizan Donation
Program and Its Implications for International Health, 47 PERSP. Bio. & MED. 100 (2004).
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drug.31 Act-utilitarianism would make the same demand if it were clear that
Merck would take a small financial loss (not a bankruptcy-inducing loss) by
investing rn ivermectrn.
Similar problems will affect any attempt to use any other form of act-
consequentialism to defend a managerial duty to maximize shareholder value.
For any end distinct from the end of maximizing shareholder value, there are pos-
sible situations in which managers can pursue the former end most efficiently by
failing to maximize shareholder value. A general managerial duty to maximize
shareholder value could not be derived from any act-consequentialist ethical
theory. Nor could such a duty be derived from a non-consequentialist theory that
lacks deontological constraints.3 2
The conclusion that act-consequentialism does not support shareholder theory
as a theory of managerial ethics may be surprising. Some notable defenses of
shareholder theory are consequentialist. Jensen, for instance, defends shareholder
value maximization by arguing that in the absence of monopolies or negative
externalities, profit-maximizing decisions by firms are Pareto-improving.33 They
harm no one, they benefit shareholders by producing profit, and they may benefit
consumers if consumers obtain consumer surplus from their purchases.34 Perhaps
Jensen's argument could be used to defend regulations that encourage firms to
focus on shareholder value. But this argument does not suffice to defend an
ethical duty to maximize profits. The only managerial courses of action Jensen
considers are declining to make a given product and selling that product at market
prices, having made the product using resources purchased at market prices.
Jensen does not consider the possibility that selling the firm's product at a below-
market price or buying labor or other resources at an above-market price could
maximize aggregate welfare. Jensen might reply that a firm cannot do this sus-
tainably if all of the markets in which it participates are perfectly competitive.
But then Jensen's argument only applies to firms operating in an idealized econ-
omy. It does not explain why a firm that has market power in at least one of the
markets in which it operates would maximize aggregate social welfare if it maxi-
mizes its profits (or the net present value of future cash flows). An adequate act-
utilitarian argument for maximizing financial returns to shareholders would need
31. This is true both for shareholder theories that tell managers to focus on shareholders' financial
interests and for shareholder theories that tell managers to consider shareholders' other interests. Nearly
ten years after Roy Vagelos's decision to have Merck donate ivermectin, he reported that there had been
no complaints about the decision from Merck's shareholders. Id. at 109. It was not entirely clear at the
time of Vagelos's decision that shareholders would react so favorably.
32. A theory can be non-consequentialist without including deontological constraints if its only
requirement is to maximize aggregate welfare (or some other measure of the collective good), but it
includes non-consequentialist permissions or "agent-centered prerogatives" to deviate from aggregate
welfare maximization. See SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, THE REJECTION OF CONSEQUENTIALISM, 14-40
(Revised Edition, 1994).
33. Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective
Function, 12 Bus. ETHICS Q. 235, 239-40 (2002).
34. Id.
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to take into account the diminishing marginal utility of wealth. A gain of a given
sum of money typically improves the welfare of a poor person more than it
improves the welfare of a rich person.35 For this reason, if a firm's shareholders
are richer on average than its employees or its customers, a business strategy that
maximizes aggregate wealth may not maximize aggregate utility.
So anyone who holds a shareholder theory of business ethics cannot defend the
non-worseness principle by rejecting deontological constraints more generally.
To justify their claim that managers have a duty to focus on advancing the inter-
ests of shareholders, potentially to the exclusion of other people's interests, share-
holder theorists must appeal to a deontological constraint. Perhaps the duty could
be grounded in a duty to respect shareholders' property rights. Perhaps the duty
could be grounded in a duty to avoid taking advantage of shareholders' vulner-
ability.36 Or perhaps the duty could be grounded in a duty to keep an implicit
promise to shareholders.3 7 Whatever constraint shareholder theorists identify as
the source of the duty, they will need to consider what other deontological con-
straints there are, and whether prohibitions on exploitation are among them. If
shareholder theorists wish to deny that there is such a thing as wrongful, mutually
beneficial, consensual exploitation, they will not be able to explain this position
by denying the existence of deontological constraints. They will have to defend
the non-worseness principle on other grounds, grounds compatible with the exis-
tence of deontological constraints.
III. KANTIAN ETHICAL THEORY SUPPORTS ANTI-EXPLOITATION NORMS
One of the most prominent ethical theories that supports deontological con-
straints is Kantian ethics. It is debatable whether Kantian ethics could be used to
support an ethical duty for managers (or for corporations) to put the interests of
shareholders first in making business decisions. It is quite clear that Kantian
ethics opposes the non-worseness principle and supports the view that there can
be mutually beneficial, consensual exploitation that is wrongful. A complete
Kantian account of the moral prohibition on exploitation would be beyond the
scope of this article. It is possible, though, to show that Kantian ethics supports
prohibitions on two specific forms of exploitation: wage exploitation and exploi-
tation in pharmaceutical pricing.
35. Daniel Bernoulli, Exposition of a New Theory of the Measurement of Risk (1738) reprinted in 22
ECONOMETRICA 23, 24 (Louise Sommer, trans. 1954) ("A poor man generally obtains more utility than
does a rich man from an equal gain.").
36. See Alexei M. Marcoux, A Fiduciary Argument against Stakeholder Theory, 13 Bus. ETHICS Q.
1 (2003). For criticism of this view, see Hasko von Kriegstein, Shareholder Primacy and Deontology,
120 Bus. & Soc. REV. 465, 471-79 (2015).
37. Suppose that when a certain corporation makes an initial public offering, or when it sells
additional shares at a later occasion, it holds itself out as a profit-oriented enterprise that would put the
interests of shareholders ahead of other people's interests when in conflict, to the extent it is morally
permissible to do so. Then this corporation makes an implicit promise that it will in general act in a
profit-maximizing way.
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Ruth Sample's Kantian account of exploitation explains the wrongfulness of
certain mutually beneficial but exploitative labor contracts.38 Sample's argument
concerning wage exploitation begins with the premise that everyone has a general
duty to take others' needs seriously. This duty does not require one to meet every-
one's needs; that is impossible.3 9 But when one chooses to interact with someone,
and when one has power over the terms of that interaction, one has an obligation
to structure the interaction in a way that takes this person's needs seriously.4 0 If
one instead structures the interaction in a way that ignores the person's needs,
and one profits or otherwise benefits from the interaction, one flouts (and does not
merely neglect) the duty to take others' needs seriously.41 One thereby uses the
person one interacts with merely as a means. 4 2 This does not entail that one ethi-
cally must ensure the satisfaction of the basic needs of everyone one interacts
with, however minimally. In the context of full-time employment, however,
employers often know that employees depend on wages from that job for their
subsistence and that the hours associated with the job preclude other ways
of making a substantial income.43 If an employer can pay employees a living
wage-one that enables them to meet their needs-but chooses not to, the
employer flouts the duty to take workers' needs seriously, and treats workers
merely as means.44
It is important to notice a limitation in this conclusion: it only asserts an obliga-
tion to pay a living wage for employers who can do so. The question whether a
corporation can pay its employees a living wage is often difficult, and Sample
does not attempt to answer it. In some cases, it may have no determinate answer.
But there are clear cases. Presumably a corporation can pay its employees more if
it is currently paying large dividends to shareholders. (Arguably, a corporation
can pay its employees more if it is currently paying any dividends.) Presumably a
corporation cannot pay its employees more if it is currently facing bankruptcy or
if paying employees more would lead it to face bankruptcy.
Sample's Kantian argument against wage exploitation has two important fea-
tures. First, the duty to refrain from wage exploitation does not derive from a
duty to address the social problem of poverty.4 5 The problem with wage
38. SAMPLE, supra note 2, at 55-96.
39. Sample accepts the standard Kantian view that there is a duty of beneficence, but the duty to
refrain from exploitation does not derive from the duty of beneficence. Rather, both duties derive in
distinct ways from the duty to respect persons. Id. at 70-71.The Kantian anti-exploitation arguments
presented in this Section are altogether distinct from the argument that the Kantian duty of beneficence
gives managers duties to stakeholders other than shareholders. For the latter argument, see Samuel
Mansell, Shareholder Theory and Kant's 'Duty of Beneficence,' 117 J. Bus. ETHICs 583 (2013).
40. SAMPLE, supra note 2, at 69-70.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 81.
44. Id.
45. Again, Sample acknowledges that there is an imperfect duty of beneficence, but she denies that
the duty to refrain from exploitation is an instance of the imperfect duty of beneficence. Id. at 70-72.
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exploitation is a problem in the relationship between employer and employee.
Sample's argument is thus entirely compatible with Friedman's view that corpo-
rations have no moral obligation to address poverty.46 Second, Sample's conclu-
sion implies that wrongful exploitation is possible in a market that is perfectly
competitive.4 7 Suppose the market for unskilled labor (or for unskilled labor of a
certain type) is perfectly competitive. Different employers obtain different
amounts of welfare surplus by hiring. If the market wage is $10, there may be
some employers who only get $10.10 worth of benefit for each hour of unskilled
labor, and there may be others who gain $20 of benefit for each hour of unskilled
labor. Employers in the former category cannot pay significantly more, and there-
fore they do not exploit their workers (even if $10 is below a living wage in this
area). Employers in the latter category may or may not be able to pay more,
depending on what other pressures they face. If they can pay more and choose not
to, despite the market wage being lower than a living wage, they wrongfully
exploit their workers.
Sample's account of wage exploitation has an obvious limitation: as written, it
only applies to full-time labor.48 The argument could perhaps be extended to
other forms of labor, such as part-time labor and contract labor, in the following
way. If a form of labor has the purpose of enabling workers to meet their needs
through wages-it is not volunteer work-then employers of workers engaged in
this form of labor should set compensation in a way that is consistent with this
labor being part of a plan for workers to meet their needs. For some forms of part-
time work, the minimum fair hourly wage will be the same as the minimum fair
hourly wage for full-time work.49 For other forms of part-time work, the fair
hourly rate will be a good deal higher than the minimum fair hourly wage for
full-time work. For example, a professional musician typically could not perform
for forty hours a week, even if the demand was there, since musicians must
rehearse and travel from one performing venue to another. Fair payment for musi-
cians would have to take this into account.
Sample's account of wage exploitation does not straightforwardly extend to
forms of economic exploitation not involving employment. Nevertheless, it is
possible to develop a Kantian account of wrongful exploitation in the market for
certain essential goods, such as medically necessary drugs. The account builds on
the principle that one should not use others in a way that inherently prevents them
from exercising their agency with a minimal level of effectiveness. If one does so
46. See Friedman, supra note 4.
47. This is clear from Sample's discussion of a hypothetical involving factory workers in a
developing country. See SAMPLE, supra note 2, at 8, 89.
48. See SAMPLE, supra note 2, at 81 ("Thus an employer is aware that the full-time employee will
necessarily be relying solely on the wages obtained from that employer for subsistence and that
accepting such employment precludes her from obtaining subsistence in other ways. If an employer fails
to compensate an employee in a way that provides her with an adequate income when such
compensation is possible, then the relationship is exploitative.").
49. The picture is complicated if full-time workers receive an essential benefit, such as health
insurance, that part-time workers do not receive.
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despite being able to structure one's interaction with those people in a way that is
compatible with their exercising at least a minimal level of effective agency, one
uses these people merely as means. In a money economy, the opportunity to use
money for purposes of one's own choosing is a central aspect of one's effective
sphere of autonomy. A person who cannot spend money on anything other than
basic needs has a limited effective sphere of autonomy. This is especially true of
people who cannot express autonomy through choices about how to satisfy basic
needs, e.g., people who cannot make meaningful choices about what to eat or
about how they will be sheltered. People do not meaningfully express their
autonomy by purchasing the only available nutritious food, or by paying to use
the only available source of safe drinking water, or by purchasing medicine they
need to survive. To have minimally effective agency in societies like ours, one
needs at least some opportunity to use money in a discretionary way.
Suppose that a firm sells a drug that some people need to survive. Suppose that
all or a substantial part of the price charged for this drug will be paid for by the
individuals who use it. (It is not wholly covered by the government or by insur-
ance plans.) Finally, suppose the firm has a choice about what price to charge.
There is a range of possible prices it could charge without going out of business,
though there are some price points that would be more profitable than others. It
may also have the option of engaging in price discrimination, making the drug
cheaper to patients with less ability to pay. 0 The profit-maximizing strategy
would force some patients to choose between financial ruin-being left with no
money for anything other than necessities-and doing without a medically neces-
sary drug. Other pricing strategies would not put patients in this position. If the
firm chooses the profit-maximizing strategy, its chosen policy would inherently
prevent some patients from exercising their rational agency within a minimally
effective sphere. The firm (and its agents) would thereby use patient-customers
merely as means.
So Kantian ethics implies that there are ethical limits on the pricing of certain
essential goods, such as necessary medicine." Note two things that the Kantian
argument does not imply. First, the Kantian argument presents no objection to
businesses that seek to get customers to pay it as much money as possible in an
autonomy-expressing way. For example, there is nothing wrong with a bookstore
trying to persuade people to spend as much money as possible on books, for a res-
taurant to try to get people to spend money on (luxury) food, or for a company
like Target, Walmart, or Amazon to try to get customers to make multiple pur-
chases from it. Second, the Kantian account does not speak to cases in which the
50. One might doubt the claim that a corporation can adopt any pricing strategy other than a profit-
maximizing strategy. But presumably it is always possible for a firm to adopt the strategy that is best for
its longevity. The business strategies that maximize expected returns to shareholders can diverge from
the strategies that are best for a firm's longevity. See Vince Buccola, Beyond Insolvency, 62 KAN. L.
REV. 1 (2013); Heaton, supra note 26; Jensen & Meckling, supra note 24.
51. A similar analysis would apply to other goods people need to survive and of which a purchase
does not express a person's autonomy. Safe drinking water is an example.
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motive for raising prices is not to maximize revenue or profit, but rather to get
people to economize in a way that enables more people to meet their needs. To
take an example from Zwolinski, a hotel manager might raise room prices after a
natural disaster partly with the aim of motivating people to share rooms if they
can, thereby maximizing the number of people who can take shelter in the hotel.5 2
If this is the hotel manager's motive for a price increase, the hotel manager argu-
ably does not use the customers' humanity merely as a means.53
So one of the most prominent non-consequentialist ethical theories, Kant's,
cannot be used to defend the non-worseness principle or to resist exploitation
claims. Kantian ethics implies that managers have moral reasons to avoid exploit-
ative wages and exploitative prices for certain necessities, such as life-saving
medicine. Managers should refrain from exploitative pricing not because manag-
ers should have a goal or an end other than maximizing shareholders' wealth. The
moral prohibitions on exploitation are not grounded in a general duty to promote
the interests of all stakeholders or in a general duty to address poverty and other
social problems. The duty to refrain from price exploitation arises from underap-
preciated deontological constraints.
IV. OTHER DEONTOLOGICAL APPROACHES
Of course, Kantian ethics is not the only ethical framework that supports deon-
tological constraints. Perhaps there is another deontological ethical theory that
provides principled support for the non-worseness principle (and thus for the
rejection of anti-exploitation norms) and that is compatible with a shareholder
theory of business ethics. This section illustrates the challenges facing two theo-
retical approaches to deontological constraints. Rule-consequentialism justifies
deontological constraints by pointing to the good consequences of their public ac-
ceptance. It cannot be used to justify a strong managerial duty to promote share-
holders' interests above the interests of others. Some ethical theories maintain
that the only deontological constraints are prohibitions on interference with
others' rights. These rights-based theories can defend a managerial duty to pro-
mote shareholders' interests only if they can defend a strong moral duty to respect
property rights. But the most plausible grounds for a strong duty to respect prop-
erty rights will also support anti-exploitation norms.
Consider rule-consequentialist justifications for deontological constraints. It
may sound odd to hear rule-consequentialism described as a deontological theory.
But rule consequentialism supports deontological constraints in the sense defined
above: there are ethical prohibitions on actions that would, in context, promote a
justified goal.54 There are various ways of formulating rule-consequentialism.
52. Matt Zwolinski, The Ethics ofPrice Gouging, 18 Bus. ETHICS Q. 347, 362-63 (2008).
5 3. Id.
54. For further argument that rule-consequentialism is a form of deontology, see Frances Howard-
Snyder, Rule Consequentialism is a Rubber Duck, 30 Am. PHIL. Q. 271 (1993).
55. Brad Hooker, Rule Consequentialism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL., (Nov. 18, 2015), https://
plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism-rule/ [https://perma.cc/6HFW-E5X6].
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One possible formulation holds that acts are right if they conform to the set of
rules whose general public acceptance would have the best effects (compared
with the general public acceptance of other possible sets of rules).56 Actions that
violate these rules are impermissible. These prohibitions are justified because
public acceptance of these rules would have good effects, even though there may
be situations in which following the rules would have bad effects. This form of
rule-consequentialism cautions against extremely complicated rules, since people
are unlikely to be able to act on them reliably. Public acceptance of a blanket rule
against theft, or a rule against theft with one or two clear, simple exceptions (e.g.
permitting non-consensual borrowing of resources to save lives in emergencies),
is likely to produce better results than public acceptance of a rule against theft
with twenty exceptions or with exceptions that involve complex conditions. This
formulation of rule-consequentialism would also caution against most rules that
include self-interested exceptions, since people are likely to decide too often that
the exceptions apply to them.
Compared with act-consequentialism, which often supports managerial
decisions to put other peoples' interests ahead of shareholders' interests, rule-
consequentialism is likely to prohibit many acts that frustrate shareholders'
interests for the sake of the general welfare. For example, rule-consequential-
ism likely prohibits managers from embezzling from a corporation to make
donations to charities-even charities that efficiently save lives. That said,
rule-consequentialism likely would not endorse a blanket rule that sharehold-
ers' (financial or other) interests should be managers' only ethical concern.
There are likely to be other, relatively simple rules whose public acceptance
would maximize aggregate welfare (or whatever the consequentialist takes to
be the good) even more.
Consider a rule calling for managers to take actions that are likely to produce a
large benefit for a group of people other than shareholders and whose effect on
other people, including shareholders, is impossible to predict. The Merck case
would be an instance of this rule: financing ivermectin was likely to (and did) pro-
duce a large benefit for people at risk for river blindness, and its effect on Merck
shareholders was impossible to predict. The rule would also support a decision to
avoid layoffs when it is clear that layoffs would harm employees but unclear
whether layoffs would be more likely to benefit or to harm shareholders' long-
term financial interests. It is likely that public acceptance of this rule would
increase aggregate welfare, compared with public acceptance of a rule requiring
managers to consider shareholders' interests exclusively (except insofar as con-
sidering others' interests tends to benefit shareholders' interests). It also seems
likely that aggregate welfare would benefit from public acceptance of a norm that
allows managers to make small sacrifices in shareholder returns when the benefit
56. This formulation of rule-consequentialism avoids the criticism that rule-consequentialism is
practically equivalent to act-consequentialism. Id. at § 8. See also RICHARD B. BRANDT, MORALITY,
UTILITARIANISM, AND RIGHTS 111-36 (1992).
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of those sacrifices to other persons is large enough. 7 So rule-consequentialism
probably does not support a purely shareholder-centered approach to managerial
ethics.
A supporter of shareholder theory who wishes to defend the non-worseness
principle and to reject anti-exploitation norms might invoke a rights-based deon-
tology. A rights-based deontological theory maintains that the only deontological
constraints are constraints on interferences with others' rights. Such a theory
might allow that there are moral reasons to pursue certain good ends; for instance,
it might say that there is a general duty of beneficence. But it would maintain that
rights, such as rights to property and to bodily integrity, are the only moral rea-
sons to refrain from pursuing a good end. On one view of rights, all rights can be
waived. On this view there is no such thing as a consensual violation of a right. A
rights-based deontology that takes this view of rights would support the non-wor-
seness principle. A consensual transaction or relationship, on this view, does not
violate anyone's rights. A mutually beneficial transaction or relationship that
does not harm third parties has better effects than non-interaction. So, according
to this rights-based deontology, a mutually beneficial, consensual transaction or
relationship cannot be morally worse than non-interaction.
Any attempt to use purely rights-based deontology to defend a shareholder
theory of business ethics faces pitfalls. A rights-based deontology can defend a
robust duty to put shareholders' interests first only by appealing to a duty to
respect shareholders' property rights. But then there must be some explanation
why shareholders' financial interest in a corporation constitutes a property right
that managers are ethically required to respect (even when they can contribute to
collective welfare by violating it)." It will not do to appeal to Lockean natural
property rights. A natural property right is a right to a specific resource that does
not derive from human-created law or custom. It arises only from universal moral
principles and from the actions and choices of individuals. John Locke famously
argued that one can acquire a natural property right by applying one's labor to a
resource, provided that one leaves "enough and as good" in common for others
and that one does not allow the resources one appropriates to spoil.59 Even if
Locke is correct about the conditions under which unowned objects could be
appropriated, it is clear that shareholders do not have Lockean natural property
rights to shares of corporations. To see this, one need not consider the theoretical
reasons for doubting that the "enough and as good" proviso is ever satisfied in
57. It is even more likely that aggregate welfare would benefit from public acceptance of a norm that
allows managers to make small sacrifices to shareholder returns in order to provide large benefits to
other primary stakeholders. Public acceptance of this norm might result in a reduction in financial
investment in firms, but that reduction may be offset by an increase in other forms of investment in firms
by other stakeholders.
58. For argument that shareholders are not co-owners of corporations, see Alan Strudler, What to Do
with Corporate Wealth, 25 J. POL. PHIL. 108 (2017).
59. JOHN LocKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, bk II, ch. 5 at 285-302 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690).
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practice when people appropriate land, gold, and other scarce, durable resources.60
One need only notice that the property rights at stake here, namely ownership of
shares of stock in corporations, are creations of the legal system, as are corpora-
tions themselves. Thus, if shareholders' ethical claims on managers derive solely
from their property rights, those claims will vary from one legal system to another.
Recognizing that any relevant property rights are creations of law, not natural
rights, one might attempt to defend a managerial duty to promote shareholders'
interests by appeal to the duty to obey the law. There are at least two problems
with an appeal to the duty to obey the law as a foundation for a shareholder theory
of business ethics. First, if managers' and corporations' duty to shareholders is
grounded on a duty to obey the law, it only applies in jurisdictions where there is,
in fact, a legal obligation to promote shareholders' interests. In some U.S. states
and in some other jurisdictions, including the UK and Germany, there are statutes
in place either legally permitting or legally requiring managers to take the inter-
ests of stakeholders other than shareholders into account. 6 1 Managers of corpora-
tions domiciled in these jurisdictions do not have a legal obligation to maximize
returns to shareholders. In Delaware, the state of incorporation of many U.S. cor-
porations, it is unclear whether the law requires managers to maximize returns to
shareholders.62 If it is unclear whether the law requires managers to prioritize the
interests of shareholders over other stakeholders, and if the law is managers' only
moral reason for adopting shareholder primacy, it is unclear why managers would
be ethically required to interpret the law in shareholders' favor.
Suppose, though, that corporate law in some jurisdiction clearly required man-
agers to put the interests of shareholders above the interests of other stakeholders.
There is still a problem with using the duty to obey the law as a foundation for a
shareholder theory of business ethics. The ethical duty to obey the law is gener-
ally understood to give people only a pro tanto duty.63 Other moral considera-
tions, possibly including the opportunity to produce a large benefit to others, can
outweigh the duty to obey the law. So if the duty to obey the law is managers'
only ethical reason to promote shareholders' interest, managers have only a pro
tanto ethical duty to put shareholders' interests first. When a corporation can do a
60. On this problem, see MICHAEL OTSUKA, LIBERTARIANISM WITHOUT INEQUALITY (2003).
61. See ERIC ORTS, BUSINESS PERSONS 212-13 (2013).
62. For arguments that American corporate law, including Delaware law, does not require
shareholder value maximization, see Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 248 (1999); Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodd v.
Ford, 3 VA. L. & Bus. REV. 163 (2008).
63. For this characterization of standard views, see David Lefkowitz, The Duty to Obey the Law, 1
PHIL. COMPASS 571, 573-74 (2006). It is clear that sometimes breaking the law is morally permissible;
indeed, sometimes it is morally required. For example, if one can save a life only if one runs diagonally
across an intersection, in violation of a law against jaywalking, one should do so. I have argued that
there is an all-things-considered duty to obey some laws in business contexts. Breaking the Law Under
Competitive Pressure, 38 LAw & PHIL. 169 (2019). For argument that some forms of lawbreaking are
morally permissible in business contexts, see Carson Young, Putting the Law in its Place: Business
Ethics and the Assumption that Illegal Implies Unethical, J. Bus. ETHICS (forthcoming).
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great deal of good for non-shareholders (e.g., employees or customers) by slightly
sacrificing the interests of shareholders, as in the case of Merck's development of
ivermectin, the ethical duty to obey the law as commonly understood yields to
welfare considerations.
There are reasons to think that the moral obligation to obey property law is
stronger than the moral obligation to obey law generally. Property rights give
people spheres in which they can make decisions about projects to pursue without
needing others' permission or good will.64 There are ethical reasons to act in
ways that are compatible with everyone having this sort of liberty. But these very
ethical reasons imply that there is a problem with a legal system that enables
some private resource owners to dominate others. People's liberty is constrained
if the only way they can feed themselves is to accept employment on harsh terms
(low wages, long hours, and the possibility of being fired on a whim and becom-
ing indigent as a consequence). People's liberty is likewise constrained if their
ability to obtain needed medicine depends on the discretionary good will of a pat-
ent owner who has the power to set prices arbitrarily. If there is a moral duty to
act consistently with others' liberty, there is a strong moral reason to respect
others' property rights. There is also a strong moral reason to refrain from using
one's position as a resource owner to dominate others, if the legal system as pres-
ently constituted fails to prevent private domination.
CONCLUSION
The central claim of shareholder theory is that managers and corporations have
a strong duty to promote the interests of shareholders, possibly to the exclusion of
others' interests. This claim is not self-evident; it stands in need of justification.
Skepticism about the possibility of mutually beneficial, consensual exploitation
typically rests on the non-worseness principle. The non-worseness principle is
not self-evident; like the central claim of shareholder theory, it stands in need of
justification. Both claims have possible justifications, but there is no plausible
ethical theory that supports both. Act-consequentialist theories and other ethical
theories that reject deontological constraints can be used to defend the non-
worseness principle, but they are incompatible with shareholder theories of busi-
ness ethics. It might be possible to defend a shareholder theory of business ethics
by appeal to deontological moral principles. But the theoretical frameworks that
could most plausibly be used to defend a strong duty to shareholders will also
support ethical prohibitions on mutually beneficial, consensual exploitation in
employment and in the markets for some goods (e.g., necessary medicine).
Therefore, those who accept shareholder theory should reject the non-worseness
principle. They should acknowledge that corporations and their managers are
sometimes morally required to deviate voluntarily from a profit-maximizing strat-
egy to avoid wrongful exploitation of employees and customers.
64. For discussion of this conception of the value of property rights, see ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, FORCE
AND FREEDOM (2009).
